Preventing future deaths from medicines:responses to coroners' concerns in England and Wales by Ferner, Robin & Cox, Anthony
 
 
University of Birmingham
Preventing future deaths from medicines
Ferner, Robin; Cox, Anthony
DOI:
10.1007/s40264-018-0738-z
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40264-018-0738-z
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Ferner, R & Cox, A 2019, 'Preventing future deaths from medicines: responses to coroners' concerns in England
and Wales', Drug Safety, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 445–451. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40264-018-0738-z,
https://doi.org/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40264-018-0738-z
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Drug Safety. The final authenticated version is available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40264-018-0738-z
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Drug Safety
 
Preventing future deaths from medicines: responses to Coroners' concerns in England
and Wales
--Manuscript Draft--
 
Manuscript Number: DRSA-D-18-00330R3
Full Title: Preventing future deaths from medicines: responses to Coroners' concerns in England
and Wales
Article Type: Original Research Article
Funding Information:
Abstract: 1.1Introduction
Coroners inquire into sudden, unexpected, or unnatural deaths. We have previously
established 99 cases (100 deaths) in England and Wales in which medicines or part of
the medication process or both were mentioned in Coroners' "Regulation 28 Reports to
Prevent Future Deaths" (Coroners' reports). We wished to see what responses were
made by NHS organizations and others to these 99 Coroners’ reports.
1.2Methods
We identified the party or parties to whom these reports were addressed, where that
was possible (names were occasionally redacted). We then sought responses, either
from the UK Judiciary website or by making requests to the addressee directly or, for
NHS and government entities, under the Freedom of Information (FoI) Act 2000.
Where responses were obtained, these were analysed by theme to indicate the steps
taken to prevent future deaths.
1.3Results
In total we were able to analyse responses to 69/99 Coroner's reports from 106
organizations.  We analysed 201 separate actions proposed or taken to address the
160 concerns expressed by Coroners. Staff education or training was the most
common form of action taken (44/201). Some organisations made changes in process
(24/201) or policy (17/201) and some felt existing policies were sufficient to address
some concerns (22/201).
1.4Conclusions
Coroners' concerns are often of national importance but are not currently shared
nationally. Only a minority of responses to Coroners' reports concerning medicines are
in the public domain. Processes for auditing responses and assessing their
effectiveness are opaque. Few of the responses appear to provide robust and
generally applicable ways to prevent future deaths.
Corresponding Author: Robin E. Ferner
City Hospital
Birmingham, UNITED KINGDOM
Corresponding Author Secondary
Information:
Corresponding Author's Institution: City Hospital
Corresponding Author's Secondary
Institution:
First Author: Robin E Ferner
First Author Secondary Information:
Order of Authors: Robin E Ferner
Tohfa Jamil Ahmad
Zainab Babatunde
Anthony R Cox, PhD
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
Order of Authors Secondary Information:
Author Comments: Dear Nitin
Preventing future deaths from medicines: responses to Coroners' concerns in England
and Wales
Thank you for your careful reading, allowing us to tidy up.
Best wishes
Robin
Response to Reviewers: Thank you again.
Robin
Suggested Reviewers: Robert Forrest, MD
Honorary Professor, University of Sheffield
robertforrest@mac.com
Physician, toxicologist, and retired Coroner
Jeffrey Aronson, DPhil
Reader, University of Oxford
jeffrey.aronson@phc.ox.ac.uk
Leading expert on medication safety with medico-legal experience
Staffan Hagg, MD
Professor, University of Linkoping
staffan.hagg@liu.se
Published on deaths from medicines
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
 Comments from the Editor: 
 
1. Please cite supplementary table 1 in the manuscript. 
> Done 
 
2. Article title and author names in the supplementary table 1 do not 
match the article. Please check. 
> Revised 
Author’s Response to Comments Click here to access/download;Author’s Response to
Comments;To Ed 2018-09-20.txt
  
Preventing future deaths from medicines: responses to Coroners’ concerns in England 
and Wales 
 
Robin E Ferner1,2, Tohfa Ahmad1, Zainab Babatunde2, Anthony R Cox1,2 
 
1 West Midlands Centre for Adverse Drug Reactions 
2 Institute of Clinical Sciences, University of Birmingham 
 
Compliance with ethical standards 
Sources of Funding 
The West Midlands Centre for Adverse Drug Reactions receive funding from the Medicines 
and Healthcare Regulatory Agency (MHRA). 
 
Conﬂict of interest  
Robin Ferner has provided medicolegal reports for coroners and others. Tohfa J Ahmad, 
Zainab Babatunde and Anthony R. Cox have no conﬂict of interest directly relevant to the 
content of this study.  
 
Ethical approval  
This study was an analysis of publicly available data. No approval was sought. 
 
1 Abstract 
1.1 Introduction 
Coroners inquire into sudden, unexpected, or unnatural deaths. We have previously 
established 99 cases (100 deaths) in England and Wales in which medicines or part of the 
medication process or both were mentioned in Coroners’ “Regulation 28 Reports to Prevent 
Future Deaths” (Coroners’ reports). We wished to see what responses were made by NHS 
organizations and others to these 99 Coroners’ reports. 
 
1.2 Methods 
We identified the party or parties to whom these reports were addressed; where that was 
possible (names were occasionally redacted). We then sought responses, either from the UK 
Revised Manuscript - with tracked changes Click here to access/download;Revised Manuscript - with
tracked changes;Coroners -2018-09-20 Marked up.docx
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Judiciary website or by making requests to the addressee directly or, for NHS and 
government entities, under the Freedom of Information (FoI) Act 2000. Where responses 
were obtained, these were analysed by theme to indicate the steps taken to prevent future 
deaths.  
 
1.3 Results 
In total we were able to analyse responses to 69/99 cases from 106 organizations.  We 
analysed 201 separate actions proposed or taken to address the 160 concerns expressed by 
Coroners. Staff education or training was the most common form of action taken (44/201). 
Some organisations made changes in process (24/201) or policy (17/201) and some felt 
existing policies were sufficient to address some concerns (22/201).  
 
1.4 Conclusions 
Coroners’ concerns are often of national importance but are not currently shared nationally. 
Only a minority of responses to Coroners’ reports concerning medicines are in the public 
domain. Processes for auditing responses and assessing their effectiveness are opaque. Few of 
the responses appear to provide robust and generally applicable ways to prevent future 
deaths. 
  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Preventing future deaths from medicines 
 
3 
 
2 Key Points 
Coroners raise important concerns in attempts to prevent future deaths.  
The concerns are often directed locally, even if the responses are relevant more widely. 
Public access to the responses is often limited.  
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3 Introduction 
Deaths from adverse drug reactions, medication errors, and the non-medicinal use of drugs 
are important. Although the mortality from adverse drug reactions associated with hospital 
admission is low in absolute terms [1], one recent Spanish study attributed 7% of all deaths in 
hospital wholly or partly to medicines [2], and another suggested that as many as 18% of 
deaths in hospital may have been related to medicines [3]. The true figures, including deaths 
in the community, are not well established. Deaths from medicines are therefore a significant 
problem, and methods to prevent them are important if patients are to be protected. 
 
In England and Wales, Coroners investigate suspicious deaths, including deaths in custody, 
and make determinations of fact, which include the cause of death. Since 2009, Coroners 
must make reports to relevant parties outlining concerns and requiring a response explaining 
how the concern will be addressed. These reports are made under regulation 28 of the 
Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, and known as Reports to Prevent Future Deaths 
(henceforth referred to in the text as Coroners’ reports). Coroners’ reports are published on 
the website of the UK Judiciary [4]. Responses are required within 56 days. Some responses, 
but not all, are subsequently posted on the UK Judiciary website. “The Chief Coroner has 
discretion over what is posted; and there may also be administrative delays.” 
 
We have previously reported findings in a consecutive series of 500 Coroners’ reports posted 
from 24 April 2015 to 7 September 2016 [5]. Of these, 99 expressed concerns about 
medicines or part of the medication process or both. The cases are listed in Supplementary 
Table 1. Interest in these problems has increased in the last two decades:  Pubmed listed 176 
citations under ‘medication error’ in 1997, 636 in 2007, and 1114 in 2017. [6] We considered 
that fatal events were most likely to prompt action to increase medication safety. We wished 
to see what responses were made by NHS organizations and others to these 99 Coroners’ 
reports.  
 
4 Methods 
We identified the addressees named in the 99 Coroners’ reports from our initial study. Where 
the addressee’s response was posted on the UK Judiciary website [4], it was downloaded for 
analysis. Where the response was not published and where the addressee was identifiable, we 
wrote to the individual or organization concerned asking for a copy, and for NHS and other 
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public organizations this was framed in the form of a FoI request. We tracked the fate of such 
requests, and where we successfully obtained information the response was analysed. 
  
A first letter was sent in August 2017, and a follow-up letter about three months later. We 
considered all information submitted to us up to 1st February 2018, that is, approximately six 
months after the first approach. Two researchers (REF and TJA) separately categorised all 
responses. Disagreements were resolved by discussion and where necessary a third researcher 
(ARC) mediated. 
 
We examined the extent to which the responses appeared to address the concerns raised by 
the Coroner. We also considered the extent to which the responses were (a) of general interest 
and (b) generally disseminated, since errors in healthcare are recognized to be important, and 
lessons easily forgotten[7].  
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5 Results 
The concerns expressed by Coroners and previously set out [5] are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 near here please 
 
The organizations that received Coroners’ reports for the 99 cases (100 deaths) we studied are 
shown in Table 2. Some organizations, such as hospitals, received more than one Coroner’s 
report and are represented more than once. The Care Quality Commission received eight 
different Coroners’ reports, the most of any organization. A Coroner’s report referred to a 
single inquest, but could raise more than one matter of concern. 
 
Table 2 near here please 
 
We identified 91 public organizations and 22 private organizations sent one or more 
Coroners’ reports.  The number of individual reports requiring a response are shown in Table 
2. One Coroner’s report omitted the name of the addressee, but was accompanied by a 
response from a hospital trust (Case 2015-0195). This was included in the figure for those 
required to respond and for those whose responses were posted on-line. 
 
We identified 125 organizations that were sent a Coroners’ reports but whose responses had 
not been published on-line at the start of our study. We in addition found one response from 
the Department of Health (Case 2015-0289) of the 34 responses already published was 
uninformative, but referred to an unpublished response from the National Medical Director of 
NHS England. We therefore requested information on the 126 required responses that were 
not in the public domain. We also requested information from a further 30 entities who were 
named in Coroners’ reports but not required to respond. These entities included NHS 
England, the Care Quality Commission, and NHS Trusts that had been sent copies of reports 
but were not required to respond. 
 
The numbers of requests and responses are summarized in Table 3. Details are provided in 
Supplementary Table 2. 
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 The responses of 44 organizations (28% cases) to Coroners’ reports were posted on the UK 
Judiciary website by the completion of the study [4]. We were able to analyse at least one 
response regarding 69/99 (70%) of the cases.   
 
Table 3 near here please 
 
Coroners’ reports specify that an answer is to be returned within 56 days. There were 53 
Coroners’ reports that gave relevant dates. For these 53 reports, the median time for a 
Coroner to issue a report was 240 [range 73–1027] days after the date of death.  The median 
time it took addressee organizations to respond to the Coroner’s report reports was 53 [range 
8–311] days.  
The responses we analysed described 201 separate actions proposed or undertaken. These 
included: staff education or training (44/201); change in processes (24/201); and altered 
policies (17/201). In some cases (22/201), organizations felt existing policies were sufficient 
(Table 4). 
 
Table 4 near here please 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Illustrative cases 
 
Case 2016-0096  
This concerned an interaction between warfarin and miconazole oral gel (to treat the patient’s 
oral thrush) that proved fatal. The MHRA issued advice to all relevant healthcare 
professionals (HCP); this message was re-iterated by the General Dental Council (GDC). The 
Welsh government issued a patient safety notice to all NHS organizations and independent 
contractor providers in Wales. The interaction warning was added to post-graduate 
educational material for dentists and pharmacist in Wales.  
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Preventing future deaths from medicines 
 
8 
 
Case 2016-0143  
A woman with malnutrition taking paracetamol reported abdominal discomfort. Her liver 
function became abnormal and, despite acetylcysteine treatment, her condition deteriorated 
and she died. The cause of death was given as 1a. Respiratory failure, 1b Pulmonary oedema, 
1c severe multi-factorial malnutrition, 2. Acute pyelonephritis, electrolyte imbalance, 
anaemia, and immune deficiency. The coroner was concerned that ‘the dose [of paracetamol] 
administered was the standard adult one’, but she weighed less than 50 kg. The trust 
responded by citing the British National Formulary, which gave no indication that dose-
adjustment was needed, and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, 
which had stated that body-weight alone was not considered a risk for paracetamol toxicity, 
although malnutrition was. The trust proposed to inform prescribers of the possible need for 
dose reduction. 
 
Case 2015-0414 
A patient with a mechanical mitral valve was advised to avoid pregnancy, but fell pregnant. 
Termination was planned for 8 weeks gestation. The patient was admitted to hospital with 
respiratory distress. The Coroner found that ‘the medical cause of death was Multi-Organ 
failure due to Acute Thrombosis of mechanical mitral valve in the first trimester of 
pregnancy…’ and that inadequate doses of enoxaparin contributed to fatal thrombosis of the 
valve. The coroner expressed concern that pregnant women with mechanical valves may be at 
risk from insufficient antithrombotic therapy with enoxaparin and insufficient review of their 
anti-factor Xa activity. The coroner was also concerned that clinicians without specialist 
cardio-obstetric knowledge across the region failed to appreciate the risks of a mechanical 
heart valve in a pregnant patient. The British Cardiovascular Society received the Coroner’s 
report, and responded by organising educational material and workshops on the theme of 
pregnancy and mechanical heart valves for its members.   
 
Case 2015-0273  
An elderly care-home patient with emphysema contracted bronchopneumonia. His GP 
prescribed antibiotics, which were administered. However, his regular medication was not 
given (aspirin, senna, doxycycline, and omeprazole). The Coroner concluded that ‘death was 
due to bronchopneumonia as a result of emphysema, and that the omission of medicines did 
not cause or contribute to the patient’s death, but the risk of such an omission causing death 
in other circumstances [was] clear.’ The care home response was to establish better 
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communication channels with GPs in the area and obtain patient care summaries from the GP 
to ensure all medications are accurately managed. It has introduced medication reviews for 
patients and regularly updates patient care plans. The care home also reported that it now 
communicated with GP practices after patients were discharged from hospital to ensure any 
change in care or medication is implemented.   
 
Case 2015-0423 
The patient was discharged from hospital after a fall. He was supposed to receive four weeks 
of prophylactic low molecular weight heparin according to hospital policy and was 
discharged to a care home with four weeks’ supply. However, documents on discharge said 3 
weeks. The care home administered for three weeks. The discrepancy in the actual supply of 
medication, and duration in the letter was not queried, leading to sub-optimal treatment 
contributing to the patient’s death. The cause of death was certified as ‘1a Pulmonary 
embolus; 1b Deep venous thrombosis; 1c Fractured right neck of femur; 2 Sub-optimal deep 
venous thrombosis prophylaxis.’ The response of the care home was not published and they 
did not respond to our request for information. The hospital, a second addressee, did carry out 
a review following the death of this patient and took action intended to reduce the risk of this 
type of error.  
 
Cases 2015-0463 and 2016-0014 
 
Two cases concern fentanyl patches. In the first case, a woman with severe chronic pain had 
been treated by fentanyl patches for four years. The night before she died, her uncle had 
applied a patch, inadvertently damaged when he removed it from packaging. The coroner 
expressed concern to the manufacturer that there were no warnings regarding the dangers of 
damaged patches. The manufacturer’s response is not available to us. In the second case, a 
woman receiving fentanyl patches as part of terminal care was told by a palliative care nurse 
to remove old patches by soaking in the bath; she had a hot bath and died, probably as a result 
of the rapid heat-induced release of remaining fentanyl from the ‘spent’ patch. The coroner 
expressed concerns to the palliative care organization, the general practice, and the 
manufacturer about these inadvertent overdoses. The manufacturer contacted the MHRA, 
who issued a warning of the potential dangers from the rapid release of fentanyl if patches are 
heated.  
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Case 2015-0229  
A patient with renal disease died from codeine poisoning. The drug was prescribed at the 
request of a locum consultant, but neither he nor the junior doctor who wrote the prescription 
was aware of the relevant trust guidelines. The Trust responded that it had carried out detailed 
investigations and found no evidence to suggest lack of knowledge or failure of locum staff. 
Nonetheless, the trust decided that codeine should no longer be available for routine 
prescription by general surgeons.  
 
Case 2015-0170 
A patient died as a result of post-traumatic epilepsy. He was prescribed sodium valproate but 
was not collecting his prescriptions. His GP saw him several times but his medication was not 
discussed. The coroner raised concerns that general practice did not have any systems in 
place to monitor uncollected prescriptions. The general practice responded that it had updated 
its systems to alert doctors to outstanding prescriptions. 
 
Case 2015-0377  
A baby died shortly after birth following a long and complicated labour. The coroner was 
concerned that registrars had delayed the administration of oxytocin, indicated on clinical 
grounds (meconium stained liquor and infrequent contractions at late stage of labour). The 
coroner also raised concerns with regards to the hospitals incident review process, which did 
not inform or involve those responsible, and thereby missed the opportunity for the 
organization and the doctors to learn from the case. The organization responded that they had 
subsequently shared learning from this case via staff communications and amended their 
review process. 
 
6 Discussion 
Coroners expressed concerns about many medication errors, and directed their reports to a 
wide range of institutions, including prisons, hospitals, care homes, government agencies or 
departments, and pharmaceutical firms. In assessing the responses to these concerns, we 
found fewer than a third of responses published on the UK Judiciary website. There were no 
clear indications of what process was involved in deciding if responses were published or any 
indication of the timeframe in which responses would be published. 
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We requested from those who had received a Coroner’s report any unpublished responses, 
using FoI legislation [8] with public bodies. ‘A safety culture encourages greater 
transparency around errors and harm, which in turn allows for open discussions to better 
understand what happened—and how to prevent recurrence of the event—as well as 
disclosure to patients’[9]. There have been long-standing calls for openness in the NHS [10], 
and openness in the NHS is government policy [11]. Nonetheless, many organizations, 
including public bodies, were slow to respond to our requests and resisted releasing 
information. In the case of public bodies, this was despite repeated requests under the 
Freedom of Information Act. This lack of transparency hampered our study and limits the 
potential value of Coroners’ reports. 
Public health physicians in Melbourne, where all responses are published, were critical of the 
‘opacity of many response letters’[12]. Only 125 of 282 responses to Coroners’ 
recommendations (44%) stated explicitly whether action had been taken or was intended. 
We were unable to find any published appraisal process to show whether coroners had 
received responses to their reports, and whether the actions outlined in responses were 
appropriate. 
 
Despite these deficiencies in the communication of medication risks and solutions, the 
Coroners’ reports prompted actions that would otherwise probably not have been taken. Our 
illustrative cases show this, but also show that there may be local problems, and local 
solutions, that would be more useful if they were disseminated more widely. In some cases, 
national bodies addressed directly (cases 2016-0096, 2015-0414) or advised by others (case 
2016-0014) issued warnings.  In other cases, local solutions were proposed to problems of 
communication (case 2015-0273), monitoring (2015-0170), and timeliness of drug 
administration (2015-0377) that would have been of national relevance. (Table 5). 
Sometimes, as when codeine was banned from surgical wards to prevent prescription of the 
drug to patients with renal impairment (case 2015-0229), proposed solutions failed to tackle 
the underlying general problem that drugs are sometimes prescribed to patients in whom they 
are contra-indicated. 
 
Table 5 near here please 
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There have been several high-profile examples of the tardy recognition of unsafe practice in 
the NHS, preventing lessons from being learnt quickly and so putting further lives at risk. 
The Independent report into deaths at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital found that poor 
prescribing and use of opiates led to a substantial number of premature patient deaths [13]. 
The inquiry found that the Coroner had not reported under ‘Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 
1984: action to prevent the recurrence of similar deaths,’ which preceded regulation 28 of the 
Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 and Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. Concerns 
about issuing such reports arise from the perception they are punitive in nature. Coroners’ 
reports may be more likely to contribute towards patient safety if they are directed to the 
relevant national organizations as well as to local addressees, but only if they are seen as an 
effort to achieve improvement. It is therefore important that concerns in such reports are 
framed constructively and are overtly conducive to patient safety.    
In other jurisdictions, Coroners can make direct recommendations, rather than simply express 
concerns and invite recommendations [14].  
For example, ‘In New Zealand coroners have a duty to identify any lessons learned from the 
deaths referred to them that might help prevent such deaths in the future’ [15]. For cases that 
are closed, these recommendations are published online in a searchable database [16]. A 
study in New Zealand retrospectively reviewed 1644 recommendations sent to one or more of 
309 recipients regarding 607 coronial enquiries [17]. Of the 607 inquests, deaths caused by 
exposure to or poisoning by noxious substances accounted for 42, and complications of 
medical and surgical care for 58. Many recommendations were addressed to the Ministry of 
Health (134) or ‘all District Health Boards’ (134), and very few were sent to individuals.  
An Australian study reviewed 30 medication-related deaths in residential care for the elderly. 
The authors identified the cases from the Australian National Coronial Information System 
over 14 years [18]. The medicines most often implicated were opioids and psychiatric 
medicines alone or together. In four cases, medicines were administered to the wrong patient. 
Coroners made recommendations, for example, regarding education and training. However, 
they did so in just three cases.  
It is not currently possible to tell whether Coroners’ reports save lives.  Coroners are 
responsible for inquiring into all manner of deaths, of which deaths related to healthcare are 
only a part. It is not, either, the place of healthcare professionals to suggest to Coroners how 
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they should operate. From the perspective of the NHS, and healthcare generally, the concerns 
that Coroners express often bring into the open systems failures and errors of general 
importance. If the Coroners’ reports were, as a matter of routine, addressed to the relevant 
national body (for example, NHS Improvement, the CQC, or the MHRA) that would ensure 
that higher level regulatory expertise could assess and act on any system-wide issues 
identified. Important information to prevent future deaths would be available to the whole 
NHS, and lessons less easily forgotten. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Medicines feature in a substantial number of Coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths. The 
concerns expressed in the reports vary widely. The Coroners’ reports are often addressed 
locally when they are of national importance, in contrast to other places such as New 
Zealand, where most reports are widely disseminated. In spite of pleas for openness and 
recognition of lessons from error improving patient safety, responses are often unpublished 
and many organisations are reluctant to share their responses. There appears to be no system 
for auditing concerns and responses to them. So it is difficult to know whether –with regards 
to medicines– the coronial system prevent future death. Only a minority of the responses that 
we have analysed appear to provide robust and generally applicable ways to prevent future 
deaths.
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1 Abstract 
1.1 Introduction 
Coroners inquire into sudden, unexpected, or unnatural deaths. We have previously 
established 99 cases (100 deaths) in England and Wales in which medicines or part of the 
medication process or both were mentioned in Coroners’ “Regulation 28 Reports to Prevent 
Future Deaths” (Coroners’ reports). We wished to see what responses were made by NHS 
organizations and others to these 99 Coroners’ reports. 
 
1.2 Methods 
We identified the party or parties to whom these reports were addressed; where that was 
possible (names were occasionally redacted). We then sought responses, either from the UK 
Revised Manuscript - clean copy Click here to access/download;Revised Manuscript - clean
copy;Coroners 2018-09-20 Clean.docx
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Judiciary website or by making requests to the addressee directly or, for NHS and 
government entities, under the Freedom of Information (FoI) Act 2000. Where responses 
were obtained, these were analysed by theme to indicate the steps taken to prevent future 
deaths.  
 
1.3 Results 
In total we were able to analyse responses to 69/99 cases from 106 organizations.  We 
analysed 201 separate actions proposed or taken to address the 160 concerns expressed by 
Coroners. Staff education or training was the most common form of action taken (44/201). 
Some organisations made changes in process (24/201) or policy (17/201) and some felt 
existing policies were sufficient to address some concerns (22/201).  
 
1.4 Conclusions 
Coroners’ concerns are often of national importance but are not currently shared nationally. 
Only a minority of responses to Coroners’ reports concerning medicines are in the public 
domain. Processes for auditing responses and assessing their effectiveness are opaque. Few of 
the responses appear to provide robust and generally applicable ways to prevent future 
deaths. 
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2 Key Points 
Coroners raise important concerns in attempts to prevent future deaths.  
The concerns are often directed locally, even if the responses are relevant more widely. 
Public access to the responses is often limited.  
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3 Introduction 
Deaths from adverse drug reactions, medication errors, and the non-medicinal use of drugs 
are important. Although the mortality from adverse drug reactions associated with hospital 
admission is low in absolute terms [1], one recent Spanish study attributed 7% of all deaths in 
hospital wholly or partly to medicines [2], and another suggested that as many as 18% of 
deaths in hospital may have been related to medicines [3]. The true figures, including deaths 
in the community, are not well established. Deaths from medicines are therefore a significant 
problem, and methods to prevent them are important if patients are to be protected. 
 
In England and Wales, Coroners investigate suspicious deaths, including deaths in custody, 
and make determinations of fact, which include the cause of death. Since 2009, Coroners 
must make reports to relevant parties outlining concerns and requiring a response explaining 
how the concern will be addressed. These reports are made under regulation 28 of the 
Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, and known as Reports to Prevent Future Deaths 
(henceforth referred to in the text as Coroners’ reports). Coroners’ reports are published on 
the website of the UK Judiciary [4]. Responses are required within 56 days. Some responses, 
but not all, are subsequently posted on the UK Judiciary website. “The Chief Coroner has 
discretion over what is posted; and there may also be administrative delays.” 
 
We have previously reported findings in a consecutive series of 500 Coroners’ reports posted 
from 24 April 2015 to 7 September 2016 [5]. Of these, 99 expressed concerns about 
medicines or part of the medication process or both. The cases are listed in Supplementary 
Table 1. Interest in these problems has increased in the last two decades:  Pubmed listed 176 
citations under ‘medication error’ in 1997, 636 in 2007, and 1114 in 2017. [6] We considered 
that fatal events were most likely to prompt action to increase medication safety. We wished 
to see what responses were made by NHS organizations and others to these 99 Coroners’ 
reports.  
 
4 Methods 
We identified the addressees named in the 99 Coroners’ reports from our initial study. Where 
the addressee’s response was posted on the UK Judiciary website [4], it was downloaded for 
analysis. Where the response was not published and where the addressee was identifiable, we 
wrote to the individual or organization concerned asking for a copy, and for NHS and other 
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public organizations this was framed in the form of a FoI request. We tracked the fate of such 
requests, and where we successfully obtained information the response was analysed. 
  
A first letter was sent in August 2017, and a follow-up letter about three months later. We 
considered all information submitted to us up to 1st February 2018, that is, approximately six 
months after the first approach. Two researchers (REF and TJA) separately categorised all 
responses. Disagreements were resolved by discussion and where necessary a third researcher 
(ARC) mediated. 
 
We examined the extent to which the responses appeared to address the concerns raised by 
the Coroner. We also considered the extent to which the responses were (a) of general interest 
and (b) generally disseminated, since errors in healthcare are recognized to be important, and 
lessons easily forgotten[7].  
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5 Results 
The concerns expressed by Coroners and previously set out [5] are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 near here please 
 
The organizations that received Coroners’ reports for the 99 cases (100 deaths) we studied are 
shown in Table 2. Some organizations, such as hospitals, received more than one Coroner’s 
report and are represented more than once. The Care Quality Commission received eight 
different Coroners’ reports, the most of any organization. A Coroner’s report referred to a 
single inquest, but could raise more than one matter of concern. 
 
Table 2 near here please 
 
We identified 91 public organizations and 22 private organizations sent one or more 
Coroners’ reports.  The number of individual reports requiring a response are shown in Table 
2. One Coroner’s report omitted the name of the addressee, but was accompanied by a 
response from a hospital trust (Case 2015-0195). This was included in the figure for those 
required to respond and for those whose responses were posted on-line. 
 
We identified 125 organizations that were sent a Coroners’ reports but whose responses had 
not been published on-line at the start of our study. We in addition found one response from 
the Department of Health (Case 2015-0289) of the 34 responses already published was 
uninformative, but referred to an unpublished response from the National Medical Director of 
NHS England. We therefore requested information on the 126 required responses that were 
not in the public domain. We also requested information from a further 30 entities who were 
named in Coroners’ reports but not required to respond. These entities included NHS 
England, the Care Quality Commission, and NHS Trusts that had been sent copies of reports 
but were not required to respond. 
 
The numbers of requests and responses are summarized in Table 3. Details are provided in 
Supplementary Table 2. 
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 The responses of 44 organizations (28% cases) to Coroners’ reports were posted on the UK 
Judiciary website by the completion of the study [4]. We were able to analyse at least one 
response regarding 69/99 (70%) of the cases.   
 
Table 3 near here please 
 
Coroners’ reports specify that an answer is to be returned within 56 days. There were 53 
Coroners’ reports that gave relevant dates. For these 53 reports, the median time for a 
Coroner to issue a report was 240 [range 73–1027] days after the date of death.  The median 
time it took addressee organizations to respond to the Coroner’s report reports was 53 [range 
8–311] days.  
The responses we analysed described 201 separate actions proposed or undertaken. These 
included: staff education or training (44/201); change in processes (24/201); and altered 
policies (17/201). In some cases (22/201), organizations felt existing policies were sufficient 
(Table 4). 
 
Table 4 near here please 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Illustrative cases 
 
Case 2016-0096  
This concerned an interaction between warfarin and miconazole oral gel (to treat the patient’s 
oral thrush) that proved fatal. The MHRA issued advice to all relevant healthcare 
professionals (HCP); this message was re-iterated by the General Dental Council (GDC). The 
Welsh government issued a patient safety notice to all NHS organizations and independent 
contractor providers in Wales. The interaction warning was added to post-graduate 
educational material for dentists and pharmacist in Wales.  
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Case 2016-0143  
A woman with malnutrition taking paracetamol reported abdominal discomfort. Her liver 
function became abnormal and, despite acetylcysteine treatment, her condition deteriorated 
and she died. The cause of death was given as 1a. Respiratory failure, 1b Pulmonary oedema, 
1c severe multi-factorial malnutrition, 2. Acute pyelonephritis, electrolyte imbalance, 
anaemia, and immune deficiency. The coroner was concerned that ‘the dose [of paracetamol] 
administered was the standard adult one’, but she weighed less than 50 kg. The trust 
responded by citing the British National Formulary, which gave no indication that dose-
adjustment was needed, and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, 
which had stated that body-weight alone was not considered a risk for paracetamol toxicity, 
although malnutrition was. The trust proposed to inform prescribers of the possible need for 
dose reduction. 
 
Case 2015-0414 
A patient with a mechanical mitral valve was advised to avoid pregnancy, but fell pregnant. 
Termination was planned for 8 weeks gestation. The patient was admitted to hospital with 
respiratory distress. The Coroner found that ‘the medical cause of death was Multi-Organ 
failure due to Acute Thrombosis of mechanical mitral valve in the first trimester of 
pregnancy…’ and that inadequate doses of enoxaparin contributed to fatal thrombosis of the 
valve. The coroner expressed concern that pregnant women with mechanical valves may be at 
risk from insufficient antithrombotic therapy with enoxaparin and insufficient review of their 
anti-factor Xa activity. The coroner was also concerned that clinicians without specialist 
cardio-obstetric knowledge across the region failed to appreciate the risks of a mechanical 
heart valve in a pregnant patient. The British Cardiovascular Society received the Coroner’s 
report, and responded by organising educational material and workshops on the theme of 
pregnancy and mechanical heart valves for its members.   
 
Case 2015-0273  
An elderly care-home patient with emphysema contracted bronchopneumonia. His GP 
prescribed antibiotics, which were administered. However, his regular medication was not 
given (aspirin, senna, doxycycline, and omeprazole). The Coroner concluded that ‘death was 
due to bronchopneumonia as a result of emphysema, and that the omission of medicines did 
not cause or contribute to the patient’s death, but the risk of such an omission causing death 
in other circumstances [was] clear.’ The care home response was to establish better 
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communication channels with GPs in the area and obtain patient care summaries from the GP 
to ensure all medications are accurately managed. It has introduced medication reviews for 
patients and regularly updates patient care plans. The care home also reported that it now 
communicated with GP practices after patients were discharged from hospital to ensure any 
change in care or medication is implemented.   
 
Case 2015-0423 
The patient was discharged from hospital after a fall. He was supposed to receive four weeks 
of prophylactic low molecular weight heparin according to hospital policy and was 
discharged to a care home with four weeks’ supply. However, documents on discharge said 3 
weeks. The care home administered for three weeks. The discrepancy in the actual supply of 
medication, and duration in the letter was not queried, leading to sub-optimal treatment 
contributing to the patient’s death. The cause of death was certified as ‘1a Pulmonary 
embolus; 1b Deep venous thrombosis; 1c Fractured right neck of femur; 2 Sub-optimal deep 
venous thrombosis prophylaxis.’ The response of the care home was not published and they 
did not respond to our request for information. The hospital, a second addressee, did carry out 
a review following the death of this patient and took action intended to reduce the risk of this 
type of error.  
 
Cases 2015-0463 and 2016-0014 
 
Two cases concern fentanyl patches. In the first case, a woman with severe chronic pain had 
been treated by fentanyl patches for four years. The night before she died, her uncle had 
applied a patch, inadvertently damaged when he removed it from packaging. The coroner 
expressed concern to the manufacturer that there were no warnings regarding the dangers of 
damaged patches. The manufacturer’s response is not available to us. In the second case, a 
woman receiving fentanyl patches as part of terminal care was told by a palliative care nurse 
to remove old patches by soaking in the bath; she had a hot bath and died, probably as a result 
of the rapid heat-induced release of remaining fentanyl from the ‘spent’ patch. The coroner 
expressed concerns to the palliative care organization, the general practice, and the 
manufacturer about these inadvertent overdoses. The manufacturer contacted the MHRA, 
who issued a warning of the potential dangers from the rapid release of fentanyl if patches are 
heated.  
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Case 2015-0229  
A patient with renal disease died from codeine poisoning. The drug was prescribed at the 
request of a locum consultant, but neither he nor the junior doctor who wrote the prescription 
was aware of the relevant trust guidelines. The Trust responded that it had carried out detailed 
investigations and found no evidence to suggest lack of knowledge or failure of locum staff. 
Nonetheless, the trust decided that codeine should no longer be available for routine 
prescription by general surgeons.  
 
Case 2015-0170 
A patient died as a result of post-traumatic epilepsy. He was prescribed sodium valproate but 
was not collecting his prescriptions. His GP saw him several times but his medication was not 
discussed. The coroner raised concerns that general practice did not have any systems in 
place to monitor uncollected prescriptions. The general practice responded that it had updated 
its systems to alert doctors to outstanding prescriptions. 
 
Case 2015-0377  
A baby died shortly after birth following a long and complicated labour. The coroner was 
concerned that registrars had delayed the administration of oxytocin, indicated on clinical 
grounds (meconium stained liquor and infrequent contractions at late stage of labour). The 
coroner also raised concerns with regards to the hospitals incident review process, which did 
not inform or involve those responsible, and thereby missed the opportunity for the 
organization and the doctors to learn from the case. The organization responded that they had 
subsequently shared learning from this case via staff communications and amended their 
review process. 
 
6 Discussion 
Coroners expressed concerns about many medication errors, and directed their reports to a 
wide range of institutions, including prisons, hospitals, care homes, government agencies or 
departments, and pharmaceutical firms. In assessing the responses to these concerns, we 
found fewer than a third of responses published on the UK Judiciary website. There were no 
clear indications of what process was involved in deciding if responses were published or any 
indication of the timeframe in which responses would be published. 
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We requested from those who had received a Coroner’s report any unpublished responses, 
using FoI legislation [8] with public bodies. ‘A safety culture encourages greater 
transparency around errors and harm, which in turn allows for open discussions to better 
understand what happened—and how to prevent recurrence of the event—as well as 
disclosure to patients’[9]. There have been long-standing calls for openness in the NHS [10], 
and openness in the NHS is government policy [11]. Nonetheless, many organizations, 
including public bodies, were slow to respond to our requests and resisted releasing 
information. In the case of public bodies, this was despite repeated requests under the 
Freedom of Information Act. This lack of transparency hampered our study and limits the 
potential value of Coroners’ reports. 
Public health physicians in Melbourne, where all responses are published, were critical of the 
‘opacity of many response letters’[12]. Only 125 of 282 responses to Coroners’ 
recommendations (44%) stated explicitly whether action had been taken or was intended. 
We were unable to find any published appraisal process to show whether coroners had 
received responses to their reports, and whether the actions outlined in responses were 
appropriate. 
 
Despite these deficiencies in the communication of medication risks and solutions, the 
Coroners’ reports prompted actions that would otherwise probably not have been taken. Our 
illustrative cases show this, but also show that there may be local problems, and local 
solutions, that would be more useful if they were disseminated more widely. In some cases, 
national bodies addressed directly (cases 2016-0096, 2015-0414) or advised by others (case 
2016-0014) issued warnings.  In other cases, local solutions were proposed to problems of 
communication (case 2015-0273), monitoring (2015-0170), and timeliness of drug 
administration (2015-0377) that would have been of national relevance. (Table 5). 
Sometimes, as when codeine was banned from surgical wards to prevent prescription of the 
drug to patients with renal impairment (case 2015-0229), proposed solutions failed to tackle 
the underlying general problem that drugs are sometimes prescribed to patients in whom they 
are contra-indicated. 
 
Table 5 near here please 
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There have been several high-profile examples of the tardy recognition of unsafe practice in 
the NHS, preventing lessons from being learnt quickly and so putting further lives at risk. 
The Independent report into deaths at the Gosport War Memorial Hospital found that poor 
prescribing and use of opiates led to a substantial number of premature patient deaths [13]. 
The inquiry found that the Coroner had not reported under ‘Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 
1984: action to prevent the recurrence of similar deaths,’ which preceded regulation 28 of the 
Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 and Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. Concerns 
about issuing such reports arise from the perception they are punitive in nature. Coroners’ 
reports may be more likely to contribute towards patient safety if they are directed to the 
relevant national organizations as well as to local addressees, but only if they are seen as an 
effort to achieve improvement. It is therefore important that concerns in such reports are 
framed constructively and are overtly conducive to patient safety.    
In other jurisdictions, Coroners can make direct recommendations, rather than simply express 
concerns and invite recommendations [14].  
For example, ‘In New Zealand coroners have a duty to identify any lessons learned from the 
deaths referred to them that might help prevent such deaths in the future’ [15]. For cases that 
are closed, these recommendations are published online in a searchable database [16]. A 
study in New Zealand retrospectively reviewed 1644 recommendations sent to one or more of 
309 recipients regarding 607 coronial enquiries [17]. Of the 607 inquests, deaths caused by 
exposure to or poisoning by noxious substances accounted for 42, and complications of 
medical and surgical care for 58. Many recommendations were addressed to the Ministry of 
Health (134) or ‘all District Health Boards’ (134), and very few were sent to individuals.  
An Australian study reviewed 30 medication-related deaths in residential care for the elderly. 
The authors identified the cases from the Australian National Coronial Information System 
over 14 years [18]. The medicines most often implicated were opioids and psychiatric 
medicines alone or together. In four cases, medicines were administered to the wrong patient. 
Coroners made recommendations, for example, regarding education and training. However, 
they did so in just three cases.  
It is not currently possible to tell whether Coroners’ reports save lives.  Coroners are 
responsible for inquiring into all manner of deaths, of which deaths related to healthcare are 
only a part. It is not, either, the place of healthcare professionals to suggest to Coroners how 
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they should operate. From the perspective of the NHS, and healthcare generally, the concerns 
that Coroners express often bring into the open systems failures and errors of general 
importance. If the Coroners’ reports were, as a matter of routine, addressed to the relevant 
national body (for example, NHS Improvement, the CQC, or the MHRA) that would ensure 
that higher level regulatory expertise could assess and act on any system-wide issues 
identified. Important information to prevent future deaths would be available to the whole 
NHS, and lessons less easily forgotten. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Medicines feature in a substantial number of Coroners’ reports to prevent future deaths. The 
concerns expressed in the reports vary widely. The Coroners’ reports are often addressed 
locally when they are of national importance, in contrast to other places such as New 
Zealand, where most reports are widely disseminated. In spite of pleas for openness and 
recognition of lessons from error improving patient safety, responses are often unpublished 
and many organisations are reluctant to share their responses. There appears to be no system 
for auditing concerns and responses to them. So it is difficult to know whether –with regards 
to medicines– the coronial system prevent future death. Only a minority of the responses that 
we have analysed appear to provide robust and generally applicable ways to prevent future 
deaths.
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Table 1. Concerns expressed by Coroners in 99 reports to prevent future deaths regarding 100 
deaths [5]. 
Concern  No. of 
occurrences 
ADR to prescribed medicines 22 
Omission of necessary treatment  21 
Monitoring failure  17 
Poor systems  17 
Poor communication  13 
Drug regulation inadequate (or failure to enforce)  9 
Interaction  7 
Contra-indicated  5 
Failure of training  5 
Susceptible patient  5 
Delayed treatment  4 
Failure to appreciate risk (of recurrent or continued 
symptoms)  
4 
Failure to warn of adverse drug reactions  4 
Excessive supply  3 
Failure to adjust dose  3 
Poor medicines control (in prison)  3 
Failure to follow protocol  2 
Failure to take history or see patient  2 
Inadequate training  2 
Inappropriate dose for patient  2 
Poor training  2 
Effect of medication hindered diagnosis  1 
Failure to follow recommended practice  1 
Failure to investigate whether excessive dose was 
given  
1 
Failure to review medicines  1 
Inadequate diagnosis before prescribing  1 
Manufacturing fault in slow-release patch  1 
Poor awareness of rare ADRs  1 
Should have been avoided  1 
Total 160 
 
  
Tables Click here to access/download;Table;Coroners Tables 1-5
2019-09-13.docx
Table 2. The distribution of addressee organizations by type for 99 Coroners’ reports 
concerning 100 deaths related to medicines 
Organisation type group 
Required 
to 
respond 
to PFD 
Response 
after FoI 
Response 
online by 
the end 
of the 
study 
Total number of 
responses made 
public  %  
Care Homes 6 1 1 2 33% 
NHS hospitals, Trusts and CCGs† 79 39 20 59 76% 
Private companies* 12 4 2 6 50% 
Individual 
ministers/Government agencies 
or department 19 6 7 12 63% 
GP surgeries and medical 
centres 12 6 5 11 92% 
Prison 6 1 3 4 67% 
Police and emergency services 4 1 1 2 50% 
Regulatory bodies and trade 
associations* 20 4 5 9 45% 
Local authorities 1 1 0 1 100% 
Total 159 63 44 107 67% 
†Includes one Coroner’s report that did not state any addressee, but to which an NHS 
Trust responded 
*Private entities are not subject to FoI legislation. We requested information from 
them. 
NHS = national health service; CCG = Clinical commissioning group; GP = General 
practitioner; FoI = Freedom of Information; PFD = Coroner’s report to Prevent 
Future Deaths 
 
  
Table 3. Responses of organizations to our request for information regarding Coroners’ 
reports in 99 cases (100 deaths). 
Number of 
entities 
required to 
respond to 
Coroners’ 
concerns 
Number of 
responses 
posted on-
line at the 
start of the 
study 
Number of 
addressees 
required to 
respond 
who were 
sent FoIs 
Total 
number 
sent FoIs or 
requests 
for data 
Number 
who 
provided 
data in 
response to 
request 
Number  
who 
responded 
but did not 
provide 
data 
Number 
who failed 
to respond 
159 34 126 156* 73 58 25 
 
*30 requests were sent to organizations named in Coroners’ reports but not required by law to 
respond; one request was sent to an organization whose on-line response contained no 
relevant information  
 Table 4. Broad categories of response to Coroners’ concerns. Many addressees proposed 
more than one action in response to a single concern.  
 
Action type number 
of 
instances 
A. Doing things better (improving systems or processes, better 
monitoring, increasing staffing level)  
   
44 
 
  
(Including Change in process 24) 
B. Looking to see if you can do things better (root cause analysis, 
review, new audit) 
32 
C. Teaching or advising people to do things better (education & 
training, warnings, new label)  
 
62 
 
  
(Including Staff education or training 44) 
D. Saying you will do things better (new policies or amended 
policies, new laws)  
 
30 
 
  
(Including Change in policy 17) 
E. Doing nothing or prevaricating (existing policies are sufficient, no 
action taken, further action under consideration)  
 
33 
 
  
(Including Existing policies sufficient 22) 
Grand Total 201 
The details of each case are in the supplementary information ‘Categories of concern’. 
Table 5: Relevance and dissemination of each concern expressed in the 69 Coroners’ reports 
for which responses were available. 
 
 Wide 
Relevance 
 
 
Widely 
Disseminated 
No Unclear Yes Total 
No 2 5 37 44 
Partly 0 0 1 1 
Yes 0 1 23 24 
Total 2 6 61 69 
 
1 
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Supplementary Table 1. Cases in which coroners made reports to prevent future deaths in which they expressed concerns about medicines or the 
medication process that contributed to death, out of a total of 500 reports published between 24th April 2015 to 7th September 2016. 
 
 Age & 
sex 
Case 
report no. 
To Drug Classification(s) Error Type 
1.  90 F 2016-0071 Managing director 
Cuerden Care 
Homes 
Low molecular 
weight heparin 
(dalteparin) 
Anticoagulants Extra five injections given; not 
causative. 
Care Home medication not 
sufficiently controlled – bad 
policies 
Excessive supply 
(unprescribed) 
2.  63 M 2016-0183 Chief Executive 
Officer Blackburn 
Lamotrigine 
Sodium 
valproate 
 Omitted while undergoing 
surgery 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
3.  43 M 2015-0451 Medical Director 
Manchester NHS 
Area Team 
Amisulpride Psychiatric Failure to prescribe; poor 
electronic communication; failure 
to notice omission of treatment; 
schizophrenia; hanged 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
4.   M 2015-0229 Chief Executive, 
Brighton 
 
Chief Nurse, 
Brighton 
 
Ward Manger, 
Brighton 
Codeine – four 
doses in 18 h 
Opioids Bipolar; fall; stage 4 kidney 
failure; pneumothorax; poisoned 
by codeine prescribed by locum; 
partial response to naloxone; 
breached local and national 
policy 
Contra-indicated 
Supplementary Table 1 Click here to access/download;Other;Coroners Supplementary Table  1 2018-09-20.pdf
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5.   M 2015-
003811 
Chief Executive 
Officer Cambrian 
Group 
 
Chief Executive, 
Guys & St Thomas 
Zopiclone + 
lorazepam 
Hypnotics and 
sedatives 
Obstructive sleep apnoea; 
severe obesity; defective CPAP 
machine; poor observations; 
failure to communicate risk to 
psychiatrists 
Contra-indicated 
6.  25 F 2015-0413 Chief Executive, 
Cheltenham 
 
Head of Legal 
Services, 
Cheltenham 
Low molecular 
weight heparin 
Anticoagulant 
Anticoagulants Severe chest pain; 
anticoagulated; but pain was 
from splenic artery aneurysm 
rupture. 
Senior clinicians not involved;  
Inadequate 
diagnosis before ℞ 
7.  43 M 2016-0238 Spectrum 
Community Health 
National Offender 
Management 
Service 
 
G4S 
Medication for 
depression and 
anxiety 
Psychiatric Hanged; did not have prescribed 
treatment; awaiting review by 
GP; health professionals not 
involved in ACCT [Assessment, 
Care in Custody, Teamwork]. 
Clear need for training. 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
8.  30 F 2016-0208 A GP practice 
 
North, East & West 
Devon Clinical 
Commissioning 
Group 
Paracetamol 
Pregabalin 
 Not prescribed. Down syndrome 
with learning difficulties. Mother-
in-law’s pregabalin. Overdose. 
Poor medicines 
control 
Susceptible 
patient 
(vulnerable adult) 
9.   M 2015-0394 Director, National 
Probation Service 
Heroin Opioids The lack of forward planning for 
his release from prison 
increased the risk of him using 
heroin. Discharged to Hostel, 
where he took heroin: in 
Monitoring failure 
3 
 
bathroom for 4 h before being 
found collapsed.  
10.   M 2015-0468 Director Birmingham 
Prison 
 
National Offender 
Management 
Service Birmingham,  
 
Prisons Minister 
 
Birmingham 
Community 
HealthCare NHS 
Trust 
Methadone 
Buprenorphine 
Diazepam 
Quetiapine 
Pregabalin 
Gabapentin 
Hyoscine 
5f-AKB48 
(cannabinoid) 
Opioids 
Psychiatric 
Drug of Abuse 
Hypnotics and 
sedatives 
He self‐administered various 
medication - non‐prescribed 
substance and legal highs – 
gained by exploiting 
inadequacies within the prison; 
post-mortem toxicology showed 
many drugs present. A cell 
search also found many drugs. 
Problems with screening visitors, 
checking prisoners, and so on. 
Poor medicines 
control 
11.   M 2015-0255 Chief Executive 
University Hospitals 
Leicester 
 
Chief Executive 
NHS England 
 
Chief Executive East 
Midlands Ambulance 
service 
Low molecular 
weight heparin 
(dalteparin) 
Anticoagulants Stroke; delay in hospital transfer; 
given usual daily dose of 
dalteparin 
Contra-indicated 
12.  85 M 2015-0301 Chief Executive, 
Northern General 
Sheffield & 
Cardiothoracic unit 
Amiodarone   No protocol for monitoring 
amiodarone in General Practice 
Monitoring failure 
13.  25 F 2015-0438 Head of Serious 
Incidents, Policy & 
Sertraline Psychiatric Hanged; dose of sertraline 
increased; failure to 
Failure to warn of 
ADRs 
4 
 
Patient Safety 
Directorate, Basildon 
communicate; dose of sertraline 
again increased; no proper 
medication history on 
assessment; risks of sertraline 
not communicated; prescribing 
without seeing the patients. 
Failure to take 
history or see 
patient 
14.  18 M 2016-0013 Chief Executive, 
Great Western 
Hospital 
Corticosteroids  Congenital adrenal hyperplasia; 
corticosteroid omitted after 
admission 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
(Withdrawal of 
corticosteroids) 
15.  32 F 2015-0463 Teva Pharma Fentanyl Opioids Accidental overdose of 
prescribed medication. A 
damaged patch released excess 
fentanyl 
Manufacturing 
fault in slow-
release patch 
16.  80 F 2015-0196 A GP Practice 
 
Director City & 
Hackney GP 
Confederation 
Asthma pump  Treated for asthma, but had 
heart failure; Out-of-hours 
service misled by prescribed 
medicines 
Poor 
communication 
17.   M 2016-0147 Sandwell & West 
Birmingham NHS 
Trust 
 
University Hospitals 
Birmingham NHS 
Trust 
Warfarin Anticoagulants Fall, brain bleed, but slow to give 
human prothrombin complex 
(Beriplex®). Aortic valve 
replacement 
Delayed treatment 
18.  50 M 2015-0170 Senior Partner, 
Springfield Medical 
Practice 
Sodium 
valproate 
 Post traumatic epilepsy; seen at 
surgery but no enquiry regarding 
failure to obtain a prescription for 
required meds; no system to 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment; 
Poor systems 
5 
 
highlight patients who fail to 
obtain necessary treatment 
(regarding repeat 
prescribing) 
19.  68 F 2015-04041 Chief Executive, 
Royal Bolton 
Hospital 
Lorazepam Hypnotics and 
sedatives 
Family allege that twice the 
recommended dose given; chart 
did not record this; not causal 
Failure to 
investigate 
whether excessive 
dose was given 
20.  16 F 2016-0222 Chief Executive, 
Walsall 
Diclofenac  Recognised ADR: bleeding; 
poor transmission of information; 
failure to consider drug cause 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines  
(not considered) 
21.  36 F 2016-0143 Rotherham Hospital Paracetamol  Severe malnutrition; standard 
dose of paracetamol given; but 
Mrs C weighted less than 50 kg; 
deranged blood tests of liver 
function 
Inappropriate dose 
for patient 
22.  36 M 2016-0239 Chief Executive, 
Wallich Centre 
 
Another 
Drug of abuse Drug of Abuse Hostel for the homeless. Found 
in lavatory with needle in groin. 
Helped to bed by fellow resident. 
Found dead next morning. Staff 
had no training or guidance.  
Failure of training 
Monitoring failure 
(after overdose) 
23.  50 F 2015-0410 Chief Executive, 
Nottinghamshire 
Healthcare NHS 
Trust 
Opiates 
Quetiapine 
Opioids 
Psychiatric 
Overdose after home leave. 
Assessed as at high risk. Given 
home leave the next day. Took 
fatal overdose. 
Failure of training 
Failure to 
appreciate risk (of 
further overdose) 
24.  86 F 2015-0402 Senior Partner, 
Alexander House 
Health Centre, 
Wigan 
Rivaroxiban 
Clopidogrel 
Anticoagulants  Intracerebral haemorrhage while 
on dual therapy for two different 
conditions: transient ischaemic 
attacks and atrial fibrillation. Also 
amyloid angiopathy. 
Interaction   
ADR to prescribed 
medicines Should 
have been 
avoided (NICE) 
6 
 
25.  25 M 2016-0058 Chief Executive, 
Nottinghamshire 
Healthcare NHS 
Trust 
 
Medical Director CRI 
 
Locality director for 
Nottinghamshire 
area Team 
Diamorphine Opioids Long history of substance 
abuse. Overdose. Psychiatrist’s 
assessment. Delay in 
appointments. A period of 
abstinence. A benefits pay-out. 
Heroin overdose caused death 
Monitoring Failure  
Failure to warn (of 
OD risk after 
abstinence) 
26.  29 
days,  F 
2015-0289  Department of 
Health 
Pertussis 
vaccine 
 Contrary to guidance, was not 
offered pertussis vaccine 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
Poor systems 
(No way of 
ensuring 
vaccination) 
27.  83 F 2016-0252 Chief Executive 
Western Sussex 
Hospitals 
 
South East Coast 
Ambulance Service 
 
Integrated Care 24 
Ltd 
Apixaban Anticoagulants Hip fracture; nose bleed; called 
NHS 111; massive GI bleed; 
patient not given details of ADRs 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines; poor 
communication 
28.   M 2015-0273 Directors of 
Springfield Care 
Home 
Doxycycline Antibiotics Chest infection; GP prescribed 
antibiotics; home had 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
7 
 
inadequate records; doxycycline 
omitted 
Poor systems 
(records 
inadequate) 
29.   M 2016-0173 Governor, HMP 
Gartree 
 
Acting Chief 
Executive, E 
Midlands Ambulance 
Service 
Prescribed and 
non-prescribed 
drugs 
 Plastic bag + overdose. 
Asphyxia and multidrug toxicity 
caused death—poor care. Took 
prescribed and non-prescribed 
drugs that he should not have 
had in his possession 
Poor medicines 
control (in prison) 
Poor systems 
30.  37 F 2015-0372 Home Secretary 
Minister of State for 
Crime Prevention 
 
Advisory Council on 
Misuse of Drugs 
Methoxy-
phenidine 
Cocaine 
Drug of Abuse Methoxyphenidine [was] not a 
controlled drug 
Drug regulation 
inadequate 
31.   M 2015-0453 National Offender 
Management 
Service 
 
G4S 
Unknown  Drugs hidden in body cavity. 
Observed to be under the 
influence of drugs. No 
assessment. Lack of 
appreciation of risk.  
Failure of training 
Monitoring failure 
(after overdose) 
32.   F 2016-0117 Acting Medical 
Director, Barts 
Morphine sulfate 
Dihydrocodeine 
Paracetamol 
Opioids Perforated caecum; caesarean; 
Ogilvie’s syndrome [colonic 
dilation]; several obstetric 
registrars were aware that the 
CT scan revealed a large 
volume in the peritoneum, but 
did not then seek a surgical 
consult 
Effect of 
medication 
hindered diagnosis 
8 
 
33.  49 M 2016-0057 Chief Executive, 
Bolton Hospital 
Antianginals  A&E does not stock; pharmacy 
prescription; pharmacy closed; 
therefore, patient did not get 
treatment 
Poor systems 
(difficult to supply 
potentially life-
saving treatment) 
34.   M 2015-0264 Chief Executive, 
Maudsley Trust 
Olanzapine Psychiatric Maudsley failed to address the 
risk of developing diabetes from 
the long-term use of olanzapine 
Monitoring failure 
35.   F 2016-0078 Chief Executive, 
Pennine Care NHS 
Foundation Trust 
 
Director of 
Commissioning/Hea
d for Mental Health, 
Rochdale, Hayward 
and Middleton CCG 
Unstated  Taken to emergency department 
acutely anxious and planning to 
jump off a viaduct: she 
subsequently ingested an 
excessive quantity of prescribed 
medication, with fatal 
consequences. The ‘Discharge 
Pad’ identified that the deceased 
was feeling suicidal and showed 
that the friend who collected her 
had expressed concern that 
Susan may take all her 
medication at once  
 
Poor medicines 
control 
36.  89 F 2015-0419 Alexandra Court 
Care Home 
Treatment for 
myasthenia 
gravis 
 Not receiving prescribed 
medication that she required to 
control the potentially life-
threatening condition 
myasthenia gravis. 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment; 
Poor systems 
(no medicines 
reconciliation) 
37.   M 2016-0248 Alexandra Court 
Care Home 
Warfarin 
 
Anticoagulants Falls, chronic subdural 
GP was not aware he was on 
warfarin 
ADR and contraindication 
ADR to prescribed 
treatment  
Susceptible 
patient (falls) 
9 
 
38.   M 2015-0192 Advisory Council on 
Misuse of Drugs 
Acetylfentanyl Opioids He was known to abuse drugs 
and drugs paraphernalia was 
found in the room with him. 
This drug is being marketed 
legally and is available over the 
internet. 
Drug regulation 
inadequate [or 
failure to enforce] 
39.  86 F 2015-0161 Minister of Health for 
Wales 
 
Chief Executive, 
Cwm Taf University 
Health Board 
Warfarin  
Colchicine 
Allopurinol 
Anticoagulants Started on colchicine and 
allopurinol; insufficient 
monitoring; cerebral infarction 
and haemorrhage 
 
 
 
Interaction → ADR 
Monitoring failure 
40.  70 M 2016-0115 Chief Executive, 
Medway NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Teicoplanin Antibiotics Failure to obtain history of 
MRSA. 
Error in recording MRSA status 
Prophylaxis omitted in patient 
with MRSA  
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
41.   M 2016-0131 Chief Executive 
North East London 
Foundation Trust 
 
Chief Officer, 
Redbridge CCG 
Citalopram, 
tramadol, 
mirtazapine 
Opioid 
Psychiatric 
Despite history of overdoses, his 
access to medicines was not 
limited. Overdose by ingesting 
excessive amounts of medicines 
Excessive supply 
42.  84 M 2015-0317 National Patient 
Safety Agency  
 
Chief Fire Officer 
Staffordshire 
 
Cetraben 
emollient cream 
 Burned to death ADR to prescribed 
medicines  
Susceptible 
patient (smoker) 
10 
 
Chief Fire Officers 
Association 
43.  ‘elderly’  
F 
2016-0047 Chief Executive, 
West Wales General 
Hospital Glangwili 
Carmarthen 
Low molecular 
weight heparin 
(Tinzaparin) 
Anticoagulants Breakdown of a left gluteal 
haematoma caused by 
tinzaparin therapy. 
Failure of monitoring creatinine 
or effect 
Monitoring failure 
Failure to adjust 
dose 
44.   F 2015-0254 Chief Executive, 
East Kent Hospital 
 
Anticoagulant 
therapy 
Anticoagulants Multiple rib fractures. INR 6. 
Haemothorax. Death 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
45.   M 2016-0163 Director of 
Commissioning, 
NHS England, 
Central Midlands 
 
President Chief Fire 
Officers 
 
Chief Executive 
Reckitt Benckiser.  
E45 emollient 
cream 
 Burned to death ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
Susceptible 
patient (smoker) 
 
46.  50 F 2015-0392 New Court Surgery Citalopram Psychiatric Depressed. Hanged. Citalopram 
for 5½ years without review 
Monitoring failure 
47.  66 F 2015-0195 Omitted Antibiotics Antibiotics Necrotizing fasciitis post op; 
inadequate antibiotic therapy 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
48.  83 F 2015-0221 Betsi Cadwaladr 
University Health 
Board 
Risperidone Psychiatric Failure to review medication; 
falls’ fracture femur. Death 
Failure to review 
medication 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
49.  58 M 2016-0228 Chief Executive, 
Stockport NHS Trust 
Enoxaparin Anticoagulants Deep vein thrombosis after 
fracture tibia and fibula. 
Inappropriate dose 
for patient 
11 
 
Weighed 99.8 kg. Given dose of 
40 mg. 
Accurate weight is essential 
50.  :50 F 2016-0111 Chesterfield Royal 
Hospital 
Potassium 
chloride 
 Prolonged QT interval, 
ventricular tachycardia, 
hypokalaemia 2.4 mmol/L, 
alcoholic liver disease 
Monitoring failure 
Failure to follow 
protocol 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
51.  1 day  
M 
2015-0377 Medical Director, 
Whittington Hospital 
Oxytocin   Meconium stained liquor. Delay 
in starting Syntocinon® infusion, 
which should have been started 
4½ hours before. Baby died. 
Delayed treatment 
Poor training 
52.   F 2015-0414 University Hospital 
Birmingham 
 
Birmingham 
Women’s NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Low molecular 
weight heparin 
(Enoxaparin) 
Anticoagulants Mechanical mitral valve; advised 
to avoid pregnancy; problem 
with valve; thrombosis of 
prosthetic valve; failure of 
hospital clinicians to prescribe 
adequate doses of enoxaparin 
contributed to the fatal 
thrombosis 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
 
53.  20 M 2015-0191 
J 
Home secretary MDMA Drug of Abuse MDMA – Drug of Abuse only 
(both brothers) obtained via 
Dark Web 
Drug regulation 
inadequate 
 19 M 2015-0191 
T 
Home secretary MDMA Drug of Abuse MDMA – Drug of Abuse only 
(both brothers) obtained via 
Dark Web 
Drug regulation 
inadequate 
54.  25 F 2015-0217 Department of 
Health 
eCigarette fluid Drug of Abuse Ingestion of one bottle → 
multiple organ dysfunction → 
death 
Drug regulation 
inadequate 
12 
 
55.   M 2015-0282 Chief Executive 
University Hospital 
of Wales  
 
Consultant 
Geriatrician 
Morphine Opioids Failure to inform GP of 
inadvertent overdose; 
inadequate systems to inform 
GP 
Poor 
communication 
Poor systems 
(failure to warn of 
potential ADR) 
 
56.  63 F 2016-0174 North Middx Hospital Clozapine Psychiatric ADR → myocarditis  
[Monitoring failure when 
admitted]  
Recommendation not related to 
ADR, but ADR → death 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
57.  83 F 2016-0062 Chief Executive 
Officer, East 
Lancashire 
Healthcare  
Low molecular 
weight heparin  
Anticoagulants Fracture of left leg and ankle. ℞ 
LMWH stopped at discharge. 
Deep venous thrombosis, 
pulmonary embolus, death 
 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
 
58.  18 M 2016-0254 Cambridge and 
Peterborough NHS 
Foundation Trust 
 
A GP Practice 
 
CCG  
 
NHS England 
  Antidepressant Psychiatric Seen by a nurse, who 
recommended an 
antidepressant 
GP prescribed anti-depressant 
without seeing patient 
Walked in front of a train 
Failure to warn of 
ADRs 
Failure to take 
history or see 
patient 
Poor 
communication 
59.  78 M 2015-0247 Chief Executive, 
Royal Devon & 
Exeter 
Flucloxacillin Antibiotics Developed cholestatic jaundice 
with flucloxacillin. Discharged 
without notifying GP of this. GP 
Practice nurse prescribed 
flucloxacillin again, provoking a 
fatal reaction 
Poor 
communication 
Failure to warn of 
ADRs 
13 
 
60.  80 F 2016-0156 Manager, Acorn 
Lodge Care Home 
Oxygen  It had been reported that the 
patient had been lying supine on 
the bed saturating at 84% and 
struggling to breath. The oxygen 
could not be heard to be running 
and it was noted that only 1 litre 
was running when this should 
have been a15 litre flow with the 
mask applied. 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
Poor training 
61.  85 M 2016-0171 Chief Executive, 
South Manchester 
University Hospital 
Trust 
Antibiotics Antibiotics Discharged from hospital without 
antibiotics or a discharge letter 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
Poor 
communication 
62.   M 2015-0237 Chief Constable of 
Surrey 
Cocaine 
Amphetamine 
Butylone 
Drug of Abuse Arrested. Taken in a police van. 
Died. Incomplete information 
provided to arresting officers. 
Especially that he had 
previously swallowed class A 
drugs. Drug-related death. 
Poor 
communication 
Failure of training 
63.  36 M 2015-0231 Director of 
Pharmacovigilance, 
MHRA 
Cocaine 
Citalopram 
Psychiatric 
Drug of Abuse 
Blood contained cocaine, 
citalopram, methadone, heroin 
Subarachnoid haemorrhage 
after cocaine while taking 
citalopram 
The drugs led to death 
Interaction  
64.   M 2016-0295 Advisory Council on 
Misuse of Drugs 
Pentobarbital  Self-administered; kept in the 
veterinary practice where 
deceased worked; it is abused. 
Drug regulation 
inadequate 
14 
 
It is only a Schedule 3 drug, not 
Schedule 2. 
65.  48 M 2016-0010 Minister for Policing, 
Fire, and Criminal 
Justice  
 
DVLA Medical 
Branch Chief 
Medical Advisor 
Alcohol 
Synthetic 
cannabinoid 
Drug of Abuse Hanging in prison. Had taken 
legal highs (5F AKB-48, 5F PB-
22)  
Drug regulation 
inadequate 
66.  93 F 2015-0310 Minister of Health 
Wales  
 
Chief Executive 
NHS Wales 
Levothyroxine  Failure to record regular 
medication on admission; 
absence of medicines 
reconciliation policy; thyroxine 
omitted for five weeks 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
Poor systems 
(No medicines 
reconciliation) 
67.  34 M 2016-0224 Governor, HMP 
Rochester 
Anabolic steroid  Drug of Abuse Anabolic-steroid induced 
cardiomyopathy; ventricular 
tachycardia, probable pulmonary 
embolism. Death in prison. 
 
Delayed treatment 
Failure to follow 
protocol 
Inadequate 
training 
68.  1 day  
M 
2015-0177 Department of 
Health; Royal 
College of Obstetrics  
 
NICE 
 
 Royal College of 
Paediatrics 
Antibiotics 
 
Antibiotics Group B streptococcus in 
previous pregnancy; no 
prophylactic antibiotics. Baby 
died from Group B strep 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
 
69.  34 M 2015-0444 Worcestershire 
Health and Care 
Propranolol 
Citalopram 
Psychiatric Asthma; had previously had 
propranolol. This was contra-
Contra-indicated 
15 
 
Olanzapine 
Amitriptyline 
 
indicated, but not noted to be 
contra-indicated in the medical 
records. While attempts had 
been made to stop it, it had 
been reintroduced 
Monitoring failure 
(ECG)  
70.  74 M 2015-0400 Chief Executive, 
Cardiff and Vale 
University Health 
Board 
Noradrenaline  Intensive care after major 
bladder surgery, noradrenaline 
line inadvertently disconnected. 
Failure to label IV lines. No 
protocol for this. 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
Poor systems 
(Lines not 
labelled) 
71.  74 F 2016-0014 Churchgate Surgery; 
Macmillan Cancer 
Care; Takeda 
Fentanyl patch Opioids Took a hot bath while wearing a 
fentanyl patch; died. Death was 
caused by fentanyl toxicity. 
Patient 
Leaflet warns on page 8 of 
‘prolonged hot bath,’ but these 
terms are not defined 
Failure to warn of 
ADRs 
72.  64 M 2016-0246 Doncaster Royal 
Infirmary 
Fluticasone (in 
Seretide®) 
 Pneumonia in a man with lung 
cancer. Inhaled fluticasone 
lowered his immunity. Coroner 
determined that fluticasone is 
not useful if the eosinophil count 
is not raised 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
73.  56 F 2015-0295 Director of 
Pharmacovigilance, 
MHRA 
 
Director CCP, NICE  
 
Lisinopril 
Spironolactone 
 Chronic kidney disease, Type 2 
DM, fibromyalgia, heart failure. 
Twenty-two different medicines. 
Non-prescribing nurse printed a 
prescription, then GP signed 
Hyperkalaemia 9.7 mmol/L → 
death 
Interaction 
Poor systems 
(non-prescriber 
decided 
prescription) 
16 
 
Medical Director, 
Lincolnshire 
Community Health 
Service 
74.  54 M 2015-0210 Secretary of State 
for Health 
 
Chief Executive 
Officer, University 
Hospital South 
Manchester 
Warfarin Anticoagulants Failed to attend anticoagulant 
clinic on three occasions; lack of 
a system for repeat prescribing.  
Poor systems 
(for repeat 
prescribing) 
75.  77 F 2015-0423 Chief Executive, HC-
One [Care Homes] 
Low molecular 
weight heparin 
(dalteparin) 
Anticoagulants Fractured neck of femur. Policy 
is to give prophylactic low 
molecular weight heparin for 4 
weeks; documents on discharge 
said 3 weeks; ‘notes inaccurate.’ 
 
Poor 
communication 
(wrong 
information) 
76.  60 F 2016-0197 Chief Executive, 
East Lancashire 
Healthcare NHS 
Trust 
Pharmacological 
thrombo-
prophylaxis  
Anticoagulants Fracture left arm and leg; not 
given appropriate prophylaxis; 
deep; vein thrombosis, death. 
Failure to follow Trust protocol 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
Poor systems 
(Failure to follow 
protocol; e-
prescribing did not 
extent to the 
emergency 
department) 
77.  95 F 2015-0241 Chief Executive, 
Heart of England 
NHS Foundation 
Trust 
Low molecular 
weight heparin 
(enoxaparin) 
and aspirin 
Anticoagulants  Atrial fibrillation, congestive 
heart failure, chronic kidney 
disease. Bled from duodenal 
ulcers. Cirrhosis. 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines  
Interaction 
17 
 
Electronic discharge letter and 
written prescription differed 
78.  23 M 2015-0474 Medical Director, 
Greater Manchester 
NHS Area Team 
 
Chief Executive, 
Greater Manchester 
West Mental Health 
NHS Foundation 
Trust 
 
Bodmin Road Health 
Centre 
Benzodiazepine 
(diazepam) 
Hypnotics and 
sedatives 
Hanging; illicit drugs (benzos) 
and legal highs found. 
Confusion over benzodiazepine 
dose reduction.  
Phoenix Futures (addiction 
support service) cannot 
prescribe 
Poor 
communication 
79.   M 2016-0017 Chief Executive, 
Stockport NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Insulin levemir  Accidentally omitted 
Died of diabetic keto-acidosis 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
 
80.   2016-0242 Chief Executive. 
Central Manchester 
University Hosp 
NHS Foundation 
Trust 
Co-amoxiclav Antibiotics Given prophylactically 
Known to have penicillin allergy 
by GP letter; co-amoxiclav 
contains a penicillin. Patient 
given co-amoxiclav, developed 
toxic epidermal necrolysis, and 
died. 
Contra-indication 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
81.  94 M 2016-0075 Chief Executive, 
Barts Health 
Opiates 
(morphine 
sulfate, 
codeine, 
fentanyl via 
epidural) 
Opioids Fall at home. Dynamic hip 
screw; pain managed with 
opiates; gradually increasing 
opiate toxicity led to aspiration 
pneumonia and death 
 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
Failure to adjust 
dose 
Susceptible 
patient 
18 
 
82.  35 M 2015-0298 Dorset Healthcare 
University NHS 
Foundation Trust 
HMP Exeter 
Methadone Opioids Known abuser of heroin, 
amphetamine, diazepam, 
cannabis. No drugs for weeks 
before admission.  Risk of self-
harm. Under 30–60 minute 
observation. Given medication 
for ‘seizures and detoxification; 
dead in the morning 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
Monitoring failure 
Poor systems 
Poor 
Communication 
83.  32 M 2015-0382 Governor, HMP 
Hewell 
Worcestershire 
Health & Care Trust 
Methadone 
Mirtazapine 
Olanzapine 
Zopiclone 
Opioids 
Psychiatric 
Hypnotics and 
sedatives 
Known high risk drug taker who 
took prescribed and other 
medicines in his cell. Death in 
prison 
Failure to 
appreciate risk (of 
illicit drug-taking) 
Poor 
communication 
Monitoring failure 
84.  29 M 2016-0042 Secretary of State 
for Health 
Acetylfentanyl Opioids ‘Legal high’ Drug regulation 
inadequate 
85.   F 2015-0199 Chief Executive, 
Surrey & Sussex 
Healthcare 
 
Chief Executive, 
Surrey & Borders 
Partnership 
30 sleeping 
tablets 
 
 Overdose. But Coroner’s 
concern was the 
misunderstandings arising from 
untrained staff as interpreters; 
and poor assessment 
Poor 
communication 
(unqualified 
interpreter) 
Inadequate 
training 
Failure to 
appreciate risk 
86.  45 F 2016-0123 Chief Executive, 
MHRA 
Opiates 
Morphine 
Tramadol 
Opioids 
Psychiatric 
Escalating dose of oral 
morphine: 100 → 280 → 500 ml 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
19 
 
Pregabalin 
Mirtazapine 
Morphine 10 mg/5 ml is not 
subject to constraints (Schedule 
5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.) 
Then died. 500 ml could be 
issued without control 
Failure to adjust 
dose 
Drug regulation 
inadequate 
 
87.  36 M 2016-0081 A GP Practice Mirtazapine 
Pregabalin 
Psychiatric Hanged; treatment was stopped 
by doctors at acute hospital 
pending review; not reviewed 
before his suicide. 
Concern: the effectiveness of 
existing office systems and 
procedures in relation to the 
receipt of discharge summaries 
from hospitals which advise on 
the review of patient’s 
medication. 
Poor systems 
(advice on review 
of medication) 
88.  17 M 2016-0176 Medical Director, 
East London NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Cannabis 
MDMA 
Drug of Abuse Taken to hospital with 
a drug related 
psychotic episode after 
having taken cannabis 
and ecstasy at a music 
festival. Assessed. 
Discharged with no 
plan. Deteriorated. 
Police officers saw him 
running towards a river. 
One gave chase. Jack 
jumped in the river and 
drowned. 
 
Poor 
communication 
Failure to 
appreciate risk (of 
recurrent or 
continued 
symptoms) 
Poor systems 
20 
 
89.  79 F 2016-0096 General Dental 
Council  
 
British Medical 
Association  
 
Royal 
Pharmaceutical 
Society 
 
Royal College of 
GPs 
  
NHS England, 
Wales, Scotland 
Warfarin 
Miconazole gel 
Anticoagulants 
Antibiotics 
Atrial fibrillation on warfarin 
Two weeks before admission: 
miconazole gel for oral thrush 
Intracerebral haemorrhage 
INR (clotting test) > 10 
[Therapeutic 2.5]. 
Died 
 
Interaction: ADR 
to prescribed 
medicines 
90.  36 M T2015-0309 Chief Executive, 
Norfolk & Suffolk 
NHS Foundation 
Trust 
Medication for 
psychiatric 
disease 
Psychiatric Medication changed. 
Psychiatrist warned of the need 
to monitor. Care coordinator did 
not know what to look for.  
Monitoring failure  
Poor 
communication 
Failure of training 
91.  86 M 2016-0079 Chief Executive, 
Royal 
Pharmaceutical 
Society 
Chief Executive, 
Dispensing Doctors’ 
Association 
Finasteride  Finasteride comes in a blister 
pack. Snipped and placed in 
MCCA. Deceased swallowed a 
tablet still in its blister pack. It 
perforated the gut and he died.  
Professional bodies advise 
against this. 
Failure to follow 
recommended 
practice 
92.   M 2015-0262 Minister for Health, 
Wales 
 
Warfarin Anticoagulants Warfarin for metallic heart valve 
Missed an INR check; continued 
prescribing without any check; 
then warfarin prescription was 
discontinued. Pharmacist 
Monitoring failure 
21 
 
Chief Executive 
Cwm Taf University 
Health Board  
 
A GP Practice 
 
Primary Clinical 
Director, Aneurin 
Bevan University 
Health Board 
 
Consultant 
Psychiatrist, North 
Community Mental 
Health Team 
nonetheless supplied it; the 
patient died from gut 
haemorrhage 
93.  96 F 2016-0080 Chief Executive 
Officer, Stockport 
NHS Foundation 
Trust 
Co-trimoxazole 
Teicoplanin 
Antibiotics Knee replacement about 2000. 
The knee became septic. No 
antibiotics were given for 48h. 
Then he was treated with co-
trimoxazole. He was also 
prescribed teicoplanin (but this 
was omitted for 24h). He 
developed disseminated 
intravascular coagulation and 
died 
Omission of 
necessary 
treatment 
(teicoplanin) 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines (co-
timoxazole) 
94.   M 2015-0437 Medical Director, 
Barts Health 
Heparin Anticoagulants Unwitnessed fall; fractured hip 
and shoulder, confused with 
heparin. 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
95.  37 M 2016-0249 Practice Manager, 
GP Medical Centre;  
 
Opioids 
Codeine 
Methadone 
Opioids 
Hypnotics and 
sedatives 
Drank alcohol and developed 
bronchopneumonia. In hospital, 
Interaction—ADR 
to prescribed 
medicines 
22 
 
Medical Director 
NHS England  
 
Medical Director,   
Greater Manchester 
Clonazepam and given naloxone. Self-
discharged 
Given daily meds 
‘Although the prescription was 
stopped, it was started again in 
error’ (clonazepam).’ Found 
dead in bed 
Poor systems 
(erroneous 
reinstatement of 
prescription) 
96.   M 2016-0245 Governor, Leicester 
Prison 
Cannabinoid Drug of Abuse Hanging in prison cell – ‘low 
traces of Mamba’ — unclear of 
relevance of Mamba. 
Inadequate observation. 
Inappropriate delay in help. 
Monitoring failure 
Delayed treatment 
(of hanging) 
97.   F 2016-0049 Chief Executive, 
Sainsbury’s 
 
Chief Executive 
Oadby & Wigston 
Borough Council 
 
Chief Executive, 
HSE 
Warfarin Anticoagulants On warfarin; fell when lift doors 
opened without warning; hit 
head. Suffered a large subdural 
bleed and died 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines (action 
relates to door 
opening) 
98.  87 F 2015-0169 Newgate Medical 
Group 
Warfarin Anticoagulants Atrial fibrillation. INR 8.0, Fall 
while the INR was high, in spite 
of vitamin K, developed 
intracerebral haemorrhage, and 
died. 
Monitoring failure: 
poor systems 
(prescribing and 
monitoring 
warfarin treatment) 
99.   M 2016-0308 MHRA Hyoscine 
butylbromide  
 Given hyoscine butylbromide 
during routine colonoscopy. 
Sudden deterioration. Cardiac 
arrest. Died 
ADR to prescribed 
medicines 
Poor awareness of 
rare ADRs 
23 
 
Risk of ADR not widely known. 
Summary of Product 
Characteristics is unsatisfactory. 
Requires amendment. 
Susceptible 
patient (ischaemic 
heart disease – 
undiagnosed) 
 
Abbreviations: A&E – Accident and Emergency Department; ADR – adverse drug reaction; DVLA – Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority; GP 
– General Practitioner; HMP – Her Majesty’s Prison; HSE – Health & Safety Executive; INR – international normalized ratio; LMWH – low 
molecular weight heparin; MCCA – multi-compartment compliance aid; MDMA = 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine; MHRA – Medicines 
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency; MRSA – methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; NHS 111 – National Health Service 
telephone urgent and emergency care service; NICE – National Institute for Health and Care Excellence.  
Preventing future deaths from medicines: responses to Coroners’ concerns in England and Wales.  Drug Safety. Robin E Ferner, Tohfa J 
Ahmad, Zainab Babatunde, Anthony R Cox. Corresponding author Robin E Ferner, Email: r.e.ferner@bham.ac.uk 
 
Supplementary Table 2. Table showing the number of organizations required to respond to the Coroners letter to prevent future death, the number of 
organisations contacted for information and their response.  
 
Judiciary 
website 
number 
Number of 
entities 
required to 
respond to 
Coroner's 
report 
Number of 
responses 
posted on-
line at the 
start of the 
study 
Number of 
addressees 
required 
to respond 
who were 
sent FoIs 
Total 
number 
sent FoIs 
or 
requests 
for data 
Number 
who 
provided 
data in 
response 
to our 
request 
Number  
who 
responded 
but did 
not 
provide 
data 
Number 
of people 
who 
failed to 
respond NOTES 
2016-
0071 1 0 1 1 0 0 1   
2016-
0183 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2015-
0451 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
NHS England provided general information, 
nothing specific on this case 
2015-
0229 3 0 3 3 3 0 0 
3 FOI to the same hospital (different 
individuals), 1 response received but response 
covered all 3 individuals 
2015-
0381 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 
Cambian group -private- did not provide data, 
Guys cited court exemption 
2015-
0413 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 
Addressed to two departments in the same 
hospital, received response that covered both 
departments 
2016-
0238 3 0 3 3 2 1 0 G4S did not provide data 
2016-
0208 2 2 0 0 0 0 0   
2015- 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
Supplementary Table 2 Click here to access/download;Other;Coroners Supplementary Table 2 2018-09-20.pdf
0394 
2015-
0468 4 0 4 4 4 0 0 
One response by MoJ covered all 4; 
Birmingham Prison ignored our individual 
request, Birmingham community gave partial 
response but cited exemption and did not 
provide copy of their individual response 
2015-
0255 3 0 3 3 1 2 2 
UHL exemption cited, NHS England gave 
general response; no details regarding this 
case, East Midlands ambulance gave full 
detailed response 
2015-
0301 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
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0438 1 0 1 1 0 0 0   
2016-
0013 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 Exemption cited then did not respond 
2015-
0463 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 Teva is private company 
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0196 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
2016-
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Two addressees, but only one required to 
respond   
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0170 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
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2016-
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0143 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
2016-
0239 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
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2016-
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Nottinghamshire health responded. CRI is 
private and did not provide detailed 
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information not specific to the case 
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Posted response by DoH refers to NHS England 
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2016-
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2016-
0173 2 1 1 1 0 1 0   
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phone but did not give specific details of this 
case. ACMD responded that they received PFD 
for information only and not required to 
respond 
2015-
0453 2 0 2 2 1 0 1   
2016-
0117 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2016-
0057 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2015-
0264 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2016-
0078 2 0 2 6 1 5 0 
Two addressees, and four further public body 
recipients 
2015-
0419 1 0 1 1 0 0 1   
2016-
0248 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
2015-
0192 1 0 1 1 0 1 0   
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0161 2 0 2 2 1 1 0 One response online now 
2016-
0115 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 
Copy of Coroner's report sent to Care Quality 
Commission 
2016-
0131 2 0 2 2 2 0 0   
2015-
0317 2 0 2 3 0 2 1 One individual with two roles sent FoI twice 
2016-
0047 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2015-
0254 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2016-
0163 3 2 1 1 0 1 0 Chief Fire Officers not required to respond 
2015-
0392 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
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0195 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Coroner's report did not name addressee 
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Health board did not provide detailed 
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during study 
2016-
0228 1 1 0 1 0 1 0   
2016-
0111 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
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0377 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 Response also now online 
2015-
0414 6 0 6 7 4 0 3 
Two Coroner's reports on the same case; a 
further Trust also named, but not required to 
respond 
2015-
0191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
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0217 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 response now online 
2015-
0282 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 
Two people at the same hospital, exemption 
cited - future publication 
2016-
0174 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2016-
0062 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2016-
0254 4 0 4 4 3 1 0   
2015-
0247 1 0 1 1 0 0 0   
2016-
0156 1 0 1 3 0 1 2 
Two further entities named, but not required 
to respond 
2016-
0171 1 1 0 1 0 1 0   
2015-
0237 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Exemption cited - available by other means; did 
not respond to follow up emails 
2015-
0231 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 MHRA exemption cited- future publication 
2016-
0295 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
ACMD stated they do not respond directly to 
Coroners- Home Office minister does this, 
Home Office did not provide details.  
2016-
0010 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 
Response online was a joint response, ACMD 
received copy for information only 
2015-
0310 2 0 2 3 0 3 0 
A further entity named, but not required to 
respond 
2016-
0224 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
2015-
0177 4 3 1 2 0 0 2   
2015-
0444 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2015-
0400 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 
A further entity named, but not required to 
respond 
2016-
0014 3 0 3 3 3 0 0 
Takeda gave information via phone; Macmillan 
stated they do not employ nurses themselves, 
it is the trust responsibility; GP surgery gave 
detailed information 
2016-
0246 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
2015-
0295 3 0 3 3 2 1 0 MHRA did not respond 
2015-
0210 2 0 2 3 0 2 1 
Copy of Coroner's report sent to Care Quality 
Commission 
2015-
0423 1 0 1 4 0 3 1 
The care home did not provide copy of their 
detailed response; copies of the Coroner's 
report were sent to an NHS Trust, a Clinical 
Commissioning Group, and a Town Council. 
2016-
0197 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2015-
0241 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2015-
0474 3 3 0 0 0 0 0   
2016-
0017 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 
Copy of Coroner's report sent to Care Quality 
Commission 
2016-
0242 1 0 1 1 0 1 0   
2016-
0075 1 0 1 3 1 1 0 
Copy of Coroner's report sent to Care Quality 
Commission and a Director of Public Health 
2015-
0298 2 0 2 2 2 0 0   
2015-
0382 2 0 2 2 2 0 0   
2016-
0042 1 0 1 1 0 1 0   
2015-
0199 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 Joint response posted online 
2016-
0123 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
2016-
0081 1 0 1 3 1 2 0 
Coroner's report also sent to NHS England and 
an NHS Trust 
2016-
0176 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 Coroner's report also sent to an NHS Trust 
2016-
0096 5 0 5 5 2 0 3   
2015-
0309 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2016-
0079 2 0 2 3 0 0 3   
2015-
0262 1 0 1 5 3 1 1 
Five addressees but matters of concern are 
addressed only to the GP practice 
2016-
0080 1 0 1 2 1 1 0   
2015-
0437 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2016-
0249 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Published response is joint response by NHS 
England and NHS Area (Manchester), health 
centre is an addressee but FOI was not sent to 
them 
2016-
0245 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
2016-
0049 3 0 3 3 3 0 0   
2015-
0169 1 0 1 1 1 0 0   
2016-
0308 1 1 0 0 0 0 0   
TOTALS 159 34 126 156 73 58 25   
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